On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism by Bix, Brian
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 75
Issue 5 Propter Honoris Respectum Article 2
8-1-2000
On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory
and Legal Positivism
Brian Bix
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1613 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol75/iss5/2
ON THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN NATURAL LAW
THEORY AND LEGAL POSITIVISM
Brian Bix*
John Finnis has been for over twenty years one of the most promi-
nent and important advocates for, and defenders of, natural law the-
ory.' Natural law theory is a broad tradition; within that broad
tradition, Finnis occupies a somewhat controversial and arguably out-
sider's position.2 Most law students come across natural law theory,
not in its usual form as a centuries-old way of thinking about morality,
theology, and politics, but rather in its more modest and modem
guise as a theory competing with legal positivism for the proper
description and analysis of law.3 While this entry onto natural law the-
ory may only serve to invite certain misunderstandings of natural law's
larger project, the continuing prominence of this perspective in law
schools and law reviews-seeing natural law mostly as an opponent of
legal positivism-requires that we not ignore this "debate." Certainly
Finnis has not ignored the "debate"; to the contrary, his work has of-
fered many provocative ways of rethinking and recasting the lines of
battle. This Article considers the points of agreement and disagree-
ment between natural law theory and legal positivism, with particular
emphasis on Finnis's views of the "debate" and his contributions to it.
* Visiting Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Professor of
Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. I am grateful to Matthew D. Adler, Lawrence
E. Mitchell, Thomas H. Morawetz, Joseph Raz, Brian Z. Tamanaha, and Robert W.
Tuttle for their comments and suggestions.
1 SeeJoHN FNmNS, NATURAL LAW AND NATuRAL RIGHTS (1980).
2 See, e.g., RUSSELL HrrrrwoER, A CRrTIQuE OF THE NEW NATuRAL LAW THEORY
(1987) (criticizing the approach to natural law developed by Germain Grisez and Fin-
nis from the perspective of traditional Thomistic natural law); Russell Hittinger, Vari-
eties of Minimalist Natural Law Theoy, 34 Am. J. Juis. 133 (1989) (same).
3 For an overview of natural law theory and the place of natural law legal theo-
ries within that larger context, see Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory: The Modem Tradition,
in HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Jules L. Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., forthcoming 2000), available in Social Science Research Network Electronic
Library (last modified Dec. 12, 1999) <http://papers.ssm.com/paper.tafABSTRACT_
ID=199928>.
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Part I considers some threshold methodological difficulties with
the inquiry. Part II considers a conventional understanding of the
boundary lines between natural law theory and legal positivism, not-
ing how many recent writers, Finnis included, have concluded that the
two schools of thought may be, in these matters at least, compatible.
Part III follows the lead of Finnis's more recent work and looks for
significant differences of perspective elsewhere, in a potential debate
over the basic value or viability of the legal positivist enterprise.
I. DANGERS OF DISCUSSING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
There is one preliminary concern. Joseph Raz has described the
dangers in talking about the views of a particular school of thought:
[0] ne of the unattractive tendencies of contemporary legal and po-
litical philosophy [is where a commentator] does not discuss any-
one's views, but a family of views. This allows one to construct one's
target by selecting features from a variety of authors so that the com-
bined picture is in fact no one's view, and all those cited as adhering
to it would disagree with it.4
The dangers must double when one is comparing two different
schools of thought, here natural law theory and legal positivism. Yet
most academics persist in talking about "schools of thought" or "move-
ments," in part because we are invited to do so by the theorists them-
selves, many of whom broadly proclaim their affiliations (as well as the
group, or group of claims, at which their criticisms are targeted), and
in part because life just becomes too complicated if one cannot dis-
cuss individual views or events as the instance of a larger group. The
trick is to try to make sure that the group one is describing is not just
the "straw man" Raz warns us about-that there is at least one major
theorist willing to affirm all the views attributed to the category de-
scribed. This Article will refer to "legal positivism" and "natural law
theory" as schools of thought, but will try to do so in a way which
respects the diversity within those titles and does not create in the
name of those groups a fictional, weak hybrid view, which no existing
or past legal theorist would actually advocate.
II. THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF THE BOUNDARY LINE
To summarize, briefly and a bit crudely, natural law theory con-
siders the connections between the universe, human nature, and mo-
rality, usually deriving the last from some combination of the first
4 Joseph Raz, Postema on Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical
Comment, 4 LEGAL THEORY 1, 1 (1998).
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two.5 The majority position within the natural law tradition appears
to be that moral truths are to be derived from truths about human
nature. A minority position in the tradition, represented by, among
others, Finnis, Germain Grisez, and Robert George, is that moral
truths are to be discovered or derived in other ways (though these
truths are connected with truths about human nature, they are not de-
rived from such truths). 6 The difference can be crucial for those at-
tempting to avoid an allegedly improper derivation of an "ought"
from an "is."7 Natural law theory discussions of human positive law
tend to focus on moral obligations: what laws should a (good) legisla-
tor pass, and when does a (good) citizen have a moral obligation to
obey the law.8
Legal positivism is the belief that it is both tenable and valuable
to offer a purely conceptual and/or purely descriptive theory of law,9
in which the analysis of law is kept strictly separate from its evalua-
5 See, e.g., YVEs R. SIMON, THE TRADITION OF NATURAL LAW: A PHILOSOPHER'S
REFLECnONS 41-66 (Vukan Kuic ed., 1965); LLOYD L. WENREB, NATuRAL LAW AND
JuSTICE 1-2 (1987) (discussing the connections between nature, law, and morality in
classical natural law theory); Bix, supra note 3, at 1-18.
6 See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw 83-87 (1999) (summariz-
ing the dispute).
7 See FrINIs, supra note 1, at 33-36 (responding to the "is/ought" challenge).
8 See, e.g., SAnr THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATrIsE ON LAW (RJ. Henle ed. &
trans., 1993) (offering a translation of sections of the Summa Theologiae that discuss
law); FNNrs, supra note 1, at 260-96.
9 Some writers within legal positivism view theories of law (compatible with that
approach) as conceptual and non-evaluative, but not descriptive (in the narrowest
sense of that term). One prominent example is Joseph Raz:
Since law belongs to the executive stage [of practical decisionmaking], it can
be identified without resort to moral arguments, which belong by definition
to the deliberative stage. The doctrine of the nature of law yields a test for
identifying law the use of which requires no resort to moral or any other
evaluative argument. But it does not follow that one can defend the doctrine
of the nature of law itself without using evaluative (though not necessarily
moral) arguments. Its justification is tied to an evaluative judgment about
the relative importance of various features of social organizations, and these
reflect our moral and intellectual interests and concerns.
JOSEPH RAZ, ETHIcS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MoRALr OF LAW AND PoLrr-
ICS 209 (1994); see alsoJoseph Raz, Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial
Comparison, 4 LEGAL THEORY 249, 267-68 (1998) (summarizing Raz's disagreement
with H.LA. Hart regarding whether Hart's legal positivistic theory is descriptive or
evaluative). But see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 239 (2d ed. 1994) ("My aim in
this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is both general and
descriptive.").
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tion.10 Modem legal positivism developed in reaction to certain (less
sophisticated) versions of natural law theory. John Austin was reacting
to some clumsy natural law references in the work of Sir William
Blackstone when he wrote what has become perhaps the most fre-
quently cited summary of legal positivistic "dogma":
The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another.
Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law,
which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or
though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation
and disapprobation."1
In a recent provocative essay, Finnis concedes that there were
some basic truths to legal positivism, but most of them had been ar-
ticulated, at least in rough form, hundreds of years ago by a theorist
best known for his development of natural law theory: Thomas Aqui-
nas.12 Finnis attributes to Aquinas the move "of taking human posi-
tive law as a subject of consideration in its own right (and its own
name), a topic readily identifiable and identified prior to any question
about its relation to morality."'1 3 For Finnis, as for Aquinas, positive
law has a role within moral thought and moral practice. Positive law
(at least generally just positive law) plays a crucial role in achieving so-
cial/common goods that require the deployment of state power (for
example, sanctions for criminal behavior) or the coordination of citi-
zen action. 14
10 See generally BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 31-49 (2d ed.
1999) (discussing Hart and legal positivism); THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LE-
GAL POSrFIIsM (Robert P. George ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE AUTONOMY OF LAw];
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
11 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). The Blackstone quotation to
which Austin was responding appears in 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 41 (University of Chicago Press 1979) (1765). For a sympa-
thetic discussion of Blackstone's natural law views, seeJ.M. Finnis, Blackstone's Theoreti-
cal Intentions, 12 NAT. L.F. 163 (1967).
12 SeeJohn Finnis, The Truth in Legal Positivism, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW, supra
note 10, at 195, 195.
13 Id. at 204.
14 See, e.g., FINNis, supra note 1, at 260-64 (discussing criminal law);John Finnis,
The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 115, 117-21 (1984) (same);John M. Finnis, Law as Co-ordination,
2 RATIO JuRIs 97, 101-03 (1989) (discussing the importance of law for social
coordination).
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There appears to be a sense in which (an important and well-
traveled branch of) natural law theory and legal positivism are com-
patible, in the sense that one's position on the first does not deter-
mine one's position on the second. If what makes one a natural law
theorist is adherence to a certain kind of metaphysical realism about
morality' 5-natural law theorists seem to agree that moral realism is
an important component of the tradition, but disagree on the extent
to which the tradition requires other significant commitments' 6-that
meta-ethical belief (moral realism) seems to be consistent with a vari-
ety of views about the (conceptual) connection between law and
morality.' 7
Similarly, if (1) natural law theory reduces to the claim that there
is objective moral truth, and that this truth should be used to evaluate
our political and legal institutions as well as our individual choices,
and (2) legal positivism reduces to the claim that there is a possibility
of and value to a descriptive or conceptual theory of law separated
from any evaluation of its (moral) merits, then there would seem no
reason why one could not support or advocate both. Indeed, a num-
ber of prominent legal positivists and natural law theorists have so
claimed at one time or another.' 8 One can find theorists who suggest
that legal positivism entails opposing natural law's views on the exis-
15 "Moral realism" has been defined as "[t]he view that moral beliefs and judge-
ments can be true or false, that there exist moral properties to which moral agents are
attentive or inattentive, sensitive or insensitive, that moral values are discovered, not
willed into existence nor constituted by emotional reactions." R.W. Hepburn, Moral
Realism, in THE OxFoRD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 596 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
16 Compare John Finnis, Natural Law, in 6 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY 685 (1998) (emphasizing moral realism), with HrITINGER, supra note 2, at 8 (de-
nying that Finnis is within the natural law tradition because his theory does not view
"nature as in some way normative"), and WErNREB, supra note 5, at 97 (equating natu-
ral law with an objective approach to morality that is ontologically based).
17 See Michael S. Moore, Law as a Functional Kind, in NATURAL LAW THEORY. CON-
TEMPORARY EssAYs 188, 192 (Robert P. George ed., 1992) [hereinafter NATURAL LAW
THEORY].
18 See, e.g., H.LA. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 10 (1983)
(describing Finnis's natural law theory as being "in many respects complementary to
rather than a rival of positivist legal theory"); Neil MacCormick, Natural Law and the
Separation of Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY, supra note 17, at 105, 109
(describing the convergences of modern legal positivism and Finnis's natural law the-
ory); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Obedience, 83 MICH. L. REV. 732, 739 (1985) (book
review) (claiming that "it is a mistake to think that the legal positivist and the natural
law traditions are inherently incompatible").
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tence of (objective) moral truths,' 9 but such theorists are distinctly in
the minority.
III. FIN'ms's Vmw OF THE BOUNDARY LiNE
The great legal positivists-whether John Austin responding to
Sir William Blackstone, 20 H.L.A. Hart in his debate with Lon Fuller,2 '
or Hans Kelsen putting forward a "pure" theory of law22-saw them-
selves as reacting against natural law theory. Were they wrong? Were
all the commentators writing about the "debate" between natural law
theory and legal positivism deluded into imagining disagreements
where there are in fact no disagreements to be found, let alone ar-
gued over?23
It may be that the boundary lines and battle lines between legal
positivism and natural law theory are to be drawn elsewhere than is
conventionally thought. In an early and classic text, Finnis suggests
one place to relocate the debate: in the small and seemingly insignifi-
cant details of theory construction.2 4
Finnis suggests a modification to an argument first put forward by
the legal positivist H.L.A. Hart. Hart had offered an important devel-
opment of legal positivism in particular, and of legal theory in gen-
eral, when he argued that theories of law should take into account,
and indeed be built around, the perspective of a participant in the
legal system-to be grounded on the meaning that aspects of the sys-
19 See, e.g., Alf Ross, Validity and the Conflict Between Legal Positivism and Natural
Law, in NORMATIV1TY AND NoRMs: CRITICAL PERSPEGrIVES ON KELSENIAN THEMES 147,
148-49 (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie Litschewski Paulson eds., 1998).
20 See AUSTIN, supra note 11, at 157-59; BLACKSTONE, supra note 11.
21 See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
22 See HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 7-8 (Bon-
nie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992) (defining "Pure Theory of
the Law"); Hans Kelsen, The Idea of Natural Law, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 27-60 (Peter Heath trans., 1973) (contrasting legal positivism and natural
law theory).
23 As the rest of this Article indicates, I think there is a real debate between legal
positivism and natural law theory. At the same time, one can reasonably conclude
that some of the legal positivists had a faulty perception of the debate, based on cari-
catured views of natural law (caricatures which may have been encouraged by the less
able exponents of that view, see e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 11).
24 See FINNis, supra note 1, at 3-18.
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tern have to those participants, as contrasted with taking the quasi-
scientific perspective of a complete outsider.25
Finnis agrees with the importance of constructing theory around
an internal point of view, but he suggests amendments to the view-
point selected by Hart. Hart uses the viewpoint of the participant who
"accepts" the legal system, in the sense of using the legal rules as the
criteria for guiding and appraising his own behavior and the behavior
of others,2 6 but Hart took a broad view of the nature and motives of
such "acceptance."2 7 Finnis suggests that this central viewpoint be
narrowed to that of the participant (1) who is following the law because
(and thus, only when) the law imposes (presumptive) moral obliga-
tions of obedience and (2) whose judgment on these subtle moral
questions is good.28
Finnis's proposed change to Hart's approach may seem a small
one, but it is one of theoretical significance. For in Hart's version, the
theorist is offering no judgments or evaluations of the moral worth of
the practice (or of the participants); the theorist is merely describing.
By contrast, in Finnis's version, theory construction requires moral
evaluation. The line being crossed is one about separating law and
morality.2 9
This small detail of theory construction returns us to what we
should perhaps now treat as the central question: whether positive law
25 See HART, supra note 9, at 55-58, 82-99 (emphasizing the importance of an
internal perspective in the course of analyzing habits, rules, and law); see also Brian
Bix, H.L.A. Hart and the Hermeneutic Turn in Legal Theory, 52 SMU L. REV. 167 (1999).
26 See HART, supra note 9, at 98.
27 See id. at 203 ("[T]heir allegiance to the system may be based on many differ-
ent considerations: calculations of long-term interest; disinterested interest in others;
an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish to do as others
do.").
28 See Fn ms, supra note 1, at 9-15; see alsoJorN FN'iIs, AQUiNAS: MORAL, PoLrn-
cAL AND LEGAL THEORY 257-58 (1998). In this text, Finnis states,
One "internalizes" the law when one willingly, promptly, readily-and not
merely out of "extrinsic" motivations of fear of punishment or hope of re-
ward-complies with its requirements, not only according to the letter of the
law but primarily according to the lawmaker's intention and plan for com-
mon good. Such states of affairs are the central case of law because they
most fully instantiate the findamental notion of law: a prescription of reason,
by means of which rational and indeed conscientious and reasonable practi-
cal judgments about the needs of a complete community's common, public
good, having been made and published by lawmakers, are understood and
adopted by citizens as the imperium of their own autonomous, individual
practical reason and will.
Id. (citations omitted).
29 See Bix, supra note 25, at 184-86.
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can valuably be studied separately from moral considerations. Finnis's
response is in the negative:
Though human law is artefact and artifice, and not a conclusion
from moral premises, both its positing and the recognition of its
positivity (by judges, professionals, citizens, and thence by descrip-
tive and critical scholars) cannot be understood without reference
to the moral principles that ground and confirm its authority or
challenge its pretention.3 0
When Finnis writes that positive law "is... not a conclusion from
moral premises," emphasis must be laid on the term "is." Finnis, fol-
lowing Aquinas, argues that the moral lawmaker will discern what laws
to promulgate largely by deduction or derivation from morality ("nat-
ural law"); in other words, morality is important in determining what
the positive law should be.3 1 However, this is a far different claim from
stating that one could use morality to determine or describe what the
positive law of a particular legal system currently is.
Legal positivists usually present their dogma about the separation
of law and morality in terms of separating the attribution of legality or
legal validity from evaluation of (the legal rules' or legal system's)
moral worth.3 2 This view of legal positivism, and of its difference from
natural law theory, is connected to an equation (mostly by non-natural
law lawyers) of natural law theory with the phrase, "lex iniusta non est
lex"33-"an unjust law is not a law."3 4 Finnis wants to transform our
discussions of legal positivism and the separation of law and morals.
He urges that natural law theorists have never denied a disjunction
30 Finnis, supra note 12, at 205.
31 See FINNIS, supra note 28, at 266-72; FnNNis, supra note 1, at 281-90; Finnis,
supra note 12, at 196-203.
32 See, e.g., HART, supra note 18, at 55.
What both Bentham and Austin were anxious to assert were the following
two simple things: first, in the absence of an expressed constitutional or legal
provision, it could not follow from the mere fact that a rule violated stan-
dards of morality that it was not a rule of law; and, conversely, it could not
follow from the mere fact that a rule was morally desirable that it was a rule
of law.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 11.
33 See, e.g., MacCormick, supra note 18, at 106 ("For long, the leading jurispru-
dential image of natural law theory presented it as defined by the thesis that unjust
laws are necessarily non-laws.").
34 The expression is true, and indeed somewhat banal, when understood as say-
ing that unjust laws are not laws "in the fullest sense," in that they do not create moral
obligations to obey them in the way thatjust laws do. See Bix, supra note 10, at 64-66;
FrNis, supra note 1, at 363-66; Norman Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Le. Laws on
Trial in Aquinas' Court of Conscience, 33 AM. J. JuRrs. 99 (1988).
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between positive law and moral merit and that lex iniusta, properly un-
derstood, never claimed the contrary.35
Finnis would urge that the more important aspect of the separa-
tion of law and morality is in the separation of legal theory and moral
evaluation. The question legal positivism raises, as noted earlier, is
whether a purely conceptual or descriptive theory of law is both tena-
ble and valuable. 386 Finnis's initial small-scale challenge regarding the
best way to construct the "internal perspective" of a legal system can
be seen as a challenge to the legal positivist position in this sense. If a
theory that does not morally evaluate its internal perspective is mark-
edly inferior to a theory that does, then a non-evaluative approach to
law may be possible, but it is of little value.
The legal positivist response to the morality-centered criticism
has often been to advocate the importance of the objective or (social)
scientific perspective. In responding to another prominent critic of
legal positivism, Ronald Dworkin, Hart puts forth the following
argument:
[IT]here is a standing need for a form of legal theory or jurispru-
dence that is descriptive and general in scope, the perspective of
which is not that of a judge deciding "what the law is," that is, what
the law requires in particular cases ... but is that of an external
observer of a form of social institution with a normative aspect,
which in its recurrence in different societies and periods exhibits
many common features of form, structure, and content.3 7
Hart's point is that moral analysis within and about the law may
be useful and important, but such importance does not negate the
value of looking at the law from the point of view of social science.
However, it is important to note that while Dworkin may deny the
value of a social science or social theory approach to law,38 it seems
clear that Finnis does not oppose such an approach. He has made
clear on a number of occasions that a "descriptive social science of
35 See Frtms, supra note 1, at 363-66 (discussing lex iniusta); Finnis, supra note
12, at 203-04 (accepting the disjunction of legal validity and moral evaluation).
36 The phrasing "both tenable and valuable" is meant to respond to the possible
view that a theory without significant moral evaluation might be possible, but it would
be a theory of little value, significantly inferior to theories which have such moral
content.
37 H.LA- Hart, Comment, in IssuEs rN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPII. THE IN-
FLUENCE OF H.L.. HART 35, 36 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987).
38 Hart points out, "In his books Dworkin appears to rule out general and de-
scriptive legal theory as misguided or at best simply useless." HART, supra note 9, at
242.
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law,"'3 9 derived in part from Max Weber and Aristotle, facilitates a
clear discussion of the nature of law.40 Finnis's complaint against
Hart (and other legal positivists) is not that one should not attempt a
general social theory of law, but rather that one should not expect
such a theory to be non-evaluative.
Finnis's view is that law should be understood in connection with
the (moral) ideal to which it is aspiring and the (moral) function it is
intended to play.4 1 One cannot fully understand a reason-giving activ-
ity unless one understands what it would take to make something a
good reason for action. 42 This approach to law could be understood as
teleological, at least in a broad or metaphoric sense of the term.43 In
pressing this approach to law, Finnis is well within the mainstream of
39 FiNNis, supra note 1, at 3.
40 See id. at 3-19; John M. Finnis, Law, Problems of the Philosophy of in OXFORD
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 468, 469 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995).
41 Finnis formulates the argument as follows:
Still, cannot descriptive analysis of law's character as an instrument proceed
without evaluating the diverse purposes and uses to which the instrument is
put? It seems not. For law's characteristic purport as obligatory and authori-
tative, like its purport as stipulating appropriate procedures and requiring
fair trials and judgments based on truth, itself proposes an evaluation and
critique of alternative social conditions (anarchy, arbitrary domination).
How, then, could there be an adequately inward understanding or analysis
of what characterizes diverse legal systems-an account showing why law de-
serves a place in any truly general account of human social life-without an
understanding of the ways law's characteristic features themselves (even
when being unjustly manipulated) manifest a critical evaluation of, and
value-affirming constructive response to, the sorts of injustice or other lesion
of human good which are inherent in lawlessness of every kind?
Finnis, supra note 40, at 469. In this position, Finnis's view converges with that of Lon
Fuller. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 41 (1940) (noting "the
danger of attempting to deal with conceptual entities [in jurisprudence and political
theory] without reference to the ends they are intended to serve"); see also Bix, supra
note 3, at 22-31 (discussing Fuller's theory). A similar point is recognized by Neil
MacCormick. See MacCormick, supra note 18, at 110-18 (discussing "the essential
moral aspiration of law-giving").
42 Lon Fuller, in the context of discussing the later treatment of evil actions vali-
dated by Nazi law, wrote of "the dilemma as that of meeting the demands of order, on
the one hand, and those of good order, on the other." See Fuller, supra note 21, at
657. From Fuller's other writings it seems clear that he might add that it is difficult to
understand the idea of "order" without having a clear notion of what "good order" is.
See generally Kenneth I. Winston, The Ideal Element in a Definition of Law, 5 LAW & PHIL.
89 (1986) (discussing Fuller's approach to law).
43 On the use of teleological explanations, see generally LARRY WRIGHr, TELEo-
LOGICAL EXPLANATIONS (1976). Not all teleological explanations are moral. For ex-
ample, it may well be that one could not properly understand a game unless one
understood the players' objectives, but (for most games) these objectives have no
1622 [VOL. 75:5
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both classical and modem versions of natural law theory, where this
aspirational or teleological approach (to morality and/or positive law)
would be the one thread connecting older figures like Cicero 44 and
Aquinas 45 with the variety of modem perspectives, including those of
Russell Hittinger,46 Fuller,47 and Finnis.48
This is where, I believe, the issue between legal positivism and
natural law theory may be finallyjoined,49 though I fear that the battle
lines will never be entirely clear. Can one hold clearly to Raz's view
that theory construction is evaluative but not moral?50 Or consider
another position Raz has argued: that it is central to the nature of law
that legal systems purport to be (legitimate) authorities, though in the
real world few (if any) succeed.51 Can we construct a theory around
the effort to be a legitimate authority, without building in a moral anal-
ysis of what it would take to be a legitimate authority (and what should
follow when legal systems fall short of this standard)?
In part, these questions Will turn on what it is legal theorists con-
ceive themselves as doing. The natural law position seems relatively
straightforward. The central question is how to live one's life, and the
presence or absence of law and the presence or absence of good law
will naturally affect such inquiries. The sociologist and historian also
may have fairly clear notions of their projects, and each may have a
clear and justified idea of why moral evaluation plays no part in their
scientific (or quasi-scientific) gathering of data.52 However, the legal
positivist has always claimed to be doing more from gathering data,
moral status or nature. Finnis's claim is not merely that law has a particular objective
or aspiration, but also that this objective or aspiration is a moral one.
44 See CIcERo, The Republic bk.3, at xxii.33, in DE RE PUBUCA, DE LEGIBus (T.E.
Page et al. eds. & Clinton Walker Keyes trans., 1928) [hereinafter DE RE PUBUcA];
CICERO, The Laws bk. II., at v.11-12, in DE RE PUBLICA, supra.
45 See AouINAs, supra note 8.
46 See HnTrINGER, supra note 2.
47 See LON L. Fu.LER, THE MORALIrT OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
48 For a more detailed discussion of that connection, see Bix, supra note 3.
49 To clarify, there may be other ways of claiming that morality or moral evalua-
tion is central to understanding law or doing legal theory, and therefore there are
other forms of natural law challenges to legal positivism. One prominent example
may be Dworkin's theory of law. See Brian Bix, Natural Law Theory, in A COMPANION
TO PHILosopHY OF LAw AND LEGAL THEORY 223, 234-37 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
50 See supra note 9.
51 See RAz, supra note 9, at 215-16. Raz goes on to derive important aspects of his
theory of law from this claim. See id. at 216-20.
52 I am aware that even here hermeneutic theorists and others have argued
against a purely descriptive or otherwise value-free approach to history and the social
sciences. See, e.g., PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO
PHi.OsoPHy (1958) (arguing for a hermeneutic approach for social theory).
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while doing something different than telling people how to live. Yet
the legal positivists have sometimes not been as clear, or as forthcom-
ing, as they might be about the exact nature and status of their
claims.5 3 When the theorists are clear, one can see how different their
theories are, not only from the natural law theorists, but also from one
another. For example, Raz's legal positivism offers a conceptual analy-
sis of the (our) concept, "law."54 In contrast, Kelsen's legal positivism
is a neo-Kantian effort to show what follows from the fact that people
in fact think in a certain sort of way-legal-normatively. 55 It may be
that these sorts of projects, and others within the legal positivist camp,
need not make room for moral teleology.
CONCLUSION
It used to be commonly believed that the disagreement between
natural law theory and legal positivism was about the legal or moral
validity of unjust official actions. Contemporary theorists in both
camps have shown that this topic is in fact one in which agreement,
rather than disagreement, predominates. Finnis has been active in
this clarification. He has also been an important figure in discerning
where the true dispute lies between natural law theory and legal posi-
tivism: he challenges the viability and value of descriptive or concep-
tual theories of law that do not partake of moral evaluation. Finnis
has developed the argument that law can only be understood in a
moral-based teleological analysis. This is a substantial challenge, one
that hits at the core of legal positivism, and it will be interesting to see
what responses legal positivism can offer. The response may come at
a meta-theoretical level, grounded in statements about the different
purposes of natural law and legal positivist theorizing and the differ-
ent status of the claims being made.
53 I have considered some of these issues elsewhere at greater length. See Bix,
supra note 10, at 9-28 (discussing issues concerning conceptual questions and juris-
prudence); Brian Bix, On Description and Legal Reasoning, in RULES AND REASONING:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FRED SCHAUER 7 (Linda Meyer ed., 1999).
54 See, e.g., Raz, supra note 9 (explicating ideas about conceptual analysis in legal
theory, in the course of considering debates between Dworkin and Hart).
55 See Stanley L. Paulson, Introduction to KELSEN, supra note 22, at xvii, xxix-xlii
(discussing Kelsen's neo-Kantian or regressive argument); see also BIx, supra note 10,
at 51-59 (summarizing Kelsen's views).
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